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RECLAIMING SPECIFIC-INTENT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN 
ANTITRUST ACT:  A BUSINESS THEORETICAL APPROACH 
 
Elias T. Xenos 
Michigan State University – Detroit College of Law 
(King Fellows Seminar) 
 
 
I. Introduction 
There is much controversy over what shades and magnitudes of intent are 
necessary to prove the variegated antitrust violations under Section 2 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.  One standard of intent that is relatively easy to articulate in theoretical 
terms, yet notoriously difficult to apply to actual factual scenarios, is “specific-intent.”  
The literature in this area furnishes a cacophony of discordant voices, and the field of 
antitrust is such that a case can be found to support almost any viewpoint.  My purpose in 
this paper is not to restate all of the conflicting definitions of specific-intent or, heaven 
forbid, to purpose yet another.  Rather, my concern is with debunking the inferences 
within the vernacular used by most federal courts in assessing specific-intent.  Moreover, 
my analysis is limited to the context of mergers and acquisitions, since theses events 
provide uniquely fertile opportunities for misapprehending the true intentions of the 
relevant parties. 
Current antitrust jurisprudence under Section 2 fundamentally ignores the 
possibility that corporations may be acting not for their legitimate competitive advantage 
or the illegitimate harm of their competitors, but for the personal benefit of their 
executives.  That a particular corporation may eventually garner monopoly profits from an 
executive’s present self-dealing is a logical red herring; the intent that resulted in the 
alleged anticompetitive conduct is of a nature completely discrete from the 
“anticompetitive animus” bespoken by the architects of our antitrust laws.  To the extent 
that intent remains an indispensable element of all criminal cases, in Justice Jackson’s 
words, “as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the 
human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between 
good and evil,”1 it is incumbent on the antitrust community to refine its understanding of 
intent in criminal antitrust violations.  Admittedly, it is of less import in civil contexts, 
since courts in civil antitrust suits are concerned primarily with the effect of the challenged 
behavior.  Nevertheless, as well noted in United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,2 
“consideration of intent may play an important role in diving the actual nature and effect 
of the alleged anticompetitive conduct.”  It is axiomatic that the less parity there exists 
between the mental element constituting intent and punishment for the proscribed act, the 
less efficient will be efforts to deter and reform. 
I begin by outlining the framework of Section 2 jurisprudence, paying particular 
attention to how the specific-intent element of the attempted monopolization charge has 
evolved through the case law.  Next, I suggest two reasons why this inquiry is not only 
important, but quite timely.  Afterward, I identify the analytic flaw that flows naturally 
from the current vernacular of antitrust law, microeconomics:  inferring specific-intent 
absent a valid business purpose.  This flaw, I explain, is the ugly stepchild of a highly 
problematic assumption of microeconomic theory—that a distinction between the firm and 
those who manage the firm is nonexistent (or otherwise insignificant).  I propose a more 
realistic set of assumptions upon which to assess Section 2 cases, based on Bebchuck, 
Fried, and Walker’s Managerial Power Approach.  Against the backdrop of this approach, 
I demonstrate how some behaviors may appear to have been driven by anticompetitive 
animus—indeed, may have resulted in a monopoly—but are in fact episodes of 
mangerialism, that is, efforts to extract excess power, pay, and privilege from the 
corporation (excess “rents”).  My concern here is with scenarios in which the methods the 
executive uses to advance his own personal interests coincide with—but are not essential 
to—those that lead to monopoly power.  I offer an alternative explanation for why an 
executive would choose to combine with a company within a related industry—thus, 
drawing the attention of antitrust regulators—when rent extraction can be obtained 
through a corporation in a non-related industry.  My purpose is not to provoke laxer or 
tighter enforcement of Section 2, but to provoke additional edification on the subject of 
specific-intent so as to enroot it with the meaning its architects envisioned. 
 
II. Framework of Section 2 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act is written as follows: 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine 
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of 
the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, 
shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be 
punished by fine not exceeding $ 10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any 
other person, $ 350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or 
by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.3 
 
In essence, the provision bans both unilateral and concerted conduct that produce 
either a monopoly or a monopsony,4 or that constitute an attempt to achieve monopoly or 
monopsony power.5  The first element of unlawful monopolization under Section 2 is the 
possession of monopoly power, or, in attempted monopolization cases, a dangerous 
probability of success in achieving monopoly power.6  My focus will be on the second 
element of attempted monopolization, specific-intent, which requires specific intent both 
do to the prohibited acts and to achieve the prohibited result of monopolization.7 
The intense controversy over the intent element in attempted monopolization cases 
finds its origin in Swift v. United States.8  Justice Holmes’ opinion in that case contains the 
following passage: 
Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result which the 
law seeks to prevent—for instance, the monopoly—but require for their 
acts in addition to the mere forces of nature to bring that result to pass, an 
intent to bring it to pass is necessary in order to produce a dangerous 
probability that it will happen.  Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 
Massachusetts 246, 272 [59 N.E. 55, 56 (1901)].  But when that intent and 
the consequent dangerous probability exist, this statute, like many others 
and like the common law in some cases, directs itself against that 
dangerous probability as well as against the completed result.”9 
 
Since Swift, most courts to visit the issue have included a specific-intent 
component in attempted monopolization cases, though typically by implication; courts 
have not routinely separated the test into a conduct component and an intent component.10 
Illustrative of the modern construction is the Supreme Court’s decision in Spectrum Sports 
v McQuillan.11  The central issue in Spectrum was whether a manufacturer’s distributor 
can, without any evidence of market power (monopoly) or specific-intent, be found liable 
for attempting to monopolize solely on the basis of predatory conduct with a dangerous 
probability of success.12  Rejecting the lower Court’s reasoning, the Supreme Court held 
that, “absent proof of a dangerous probability that [the distributor] would monopolize a 
particular market and specific intent to monopolize,” there is no liability for attempted 
monopolization under Section 2.13 
 Like Swift and Spectrum, most attempted monopolization cases involve allegations 
of well-defined predatory business practices, namely, price-fixing, territorial allocations, 
vertical integrations, and tie-in arrangements.14  Where compelling evidence of predatory 
practices is presented, a court will usually infer the presence of specific-intent.  Only a 
true advocate would question this inferential relationship.  Nevertheless, this analytic 
approach does involve a logical stretch:  “Even when intent is used in a manner favorable 
to the defendant—inviting the jury to find no specific intent to monopolize when the 
defendant intended to achieve a legitimate purpose—the jury speculates about the 
defendant’s soul.”15  As mentioned earlier, mergers and acquisitions in this respect 
engender heightened concern. 
 
III. Why the Inquiry into Section 2? 
 In recent times, mergers and acquisitions have been regulated primarily through 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, because of the lower scienter burden for the 
plaintiff/prosecution; the “effect” of the corporate combination is the lodestar for 
determining legality, notwithstanding the subjective or specific-intent of the parties.  This 
is not to say that corporate combinations that tend to increase market share in a particular 
industry have not been attacked through Section 2.  Indeed, they have.  One such case is 
United Steel v Columbia Steel Company.16  In this case, the United States Steel 
Corporation attempted to purchase the assets of an independent steel maker.  The 
Government challenged the acquisition on the grounds that it was an attempt by U.S. Steel 
to monopolize the market in certain fabricated steel products, and so would unlawfully 
restrain competition.  Reasoning that the defendant company exhibited a “normal business 
purpose,” the Supreme Court concluded that the specific-intent element of the Section 2 
charge was lacking.  Accordingly, the Court found that there was no attempted 
monopolization.17 
 Why, then, is it important to struggle through determining the real intent of the 
corporate decision makers when these activities are usually regulated through other 
statutory schemes?  The reason is two-fold.  First, the unique insights gleaned from 
applying the Section 2 framework to mergers and acquisitions in the hypothetical can be 
extrapolated to advance our understanding of specific-intent in other contexts—where 
Section 2 is in fact rigorously enforced. 
The second, and more important reason, is that criminal penalties for 
anticompetitive motivations with respect to mergers and acquisitions are available only 
through the Sherman Act—and not Section 7.  As our quest to quench our thirst for 
enhanced corporate scrutiny accelerates with every exposure of brazen managerial self-
dealing, we are likely to rekindle the policies of a more vigilant antitrust era.  This author 
predicts that criminal prosecution will become more prevalent for all categories of 
antitrust violations, including mergers and acquisitions.  When asked in any interview 
about any “changes, improvements, or differences in the way [the Department of Justice] 
goes about criminal enforcement,” current Assistant Attorney General Charles James 
stated the following:  “[W]e want to transform a largely reactive enforcement regime to 
something that’s more proactive….  We have tried to be very visible and reach out to 
people who might have information or concerns about potentially anticompetitive 
conduct.”18  His words likely form a prologue to what is ahead for the Division.   
To be sure, James’ posturing is part of a larger historical pattern that has evolved 
since the late 20th century:  scandal on the heels of a bull market, and then a zealous 
crackdown.19  In reaction to the abuses of the late 1920s stock market swindlers, 
lawmakers passed the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934.20  
Likewise, the Sherman Act was enacted after a decade of violence among laborers and 
farmers culminating in widespread violence.21  It was a volatile period in which new 
economic systems were debated—even Marxist solutions.22  Most recently, the Sarbanes-
Oxley legislation was passed, which requires new corporate governance standards and 
increases criminal penalties for securities laws violations.  Sound familiar? 
It makes sense that mergers and acquisitions may be the subject of intensified 
reform efforts.  After all, it was ill-advised—some would say, knowingly destructive—
corporate combinations and divestitures that fueled many of the false illusions of the 
1990’s, resulting in a market collapse.  Marcia Vickers and Mike France of Business Week 
illuminate the link between mergers and acquisitions and the stock market collapse in their 
cover story, “How Corrupt is Wall Street?”23  During the late 1990s, the authors point out, 
investment bank analysts’ pay was tied to how much investment banking business they 
could bring in.  Compensation consultant Alan Johnson of Johnson Associates, Inc. 
concurs:  “the sales [mergers and acquisitions] part of the analysts’ jobs become huge.”  In 
one such “sale,” Enron paid $323 million investment banking fees. 
An insightful passage on what drives criminal prosecution of corporate crooks is 
found in Neale’s The Antitrust Laws of the U.S.A: 
[C]ivil remedies do not carry the odium of criminal penalties, and for this 
reason, even when they are drastic in effect, do not touch the public sense 
of justice in the same way as severe criminal penalties….  [T]he real 
sanction of the antitrust laws will still lie not so much in the risk of 
financial penalty as in the sheer fact of criminal indictment as it affects 
businessmen who have a respected place in their communities.  Criminal 
proceedings under the Sherman Act involve ‘going quietly’ with the 
policeman, having your fingerprints taken and all the other unattractive 
incidents of any crime, together, of course, with a  considerable amount of 
unfavourable publicity and the heavy costs of defending the suit.24 
 
With this in mind, the task of refining our understanding of the mental processes incident 
to mergers and acquisitions could not be timelier, lest we upset Justice Jackson’s prescient 
observations on the human will. 
 
III. An Inferential Leap 
 Legal scholars Roland A. Cass and Keith N. Hylton convincingly argue that 
federal courts have shown that a preference for an objective approach to determining 
specific-intent.25  Not to be confused with general intent, a court makes an inferential 
connection between the absence of any legitimate business justification and a specific 
intent to monopolize.26  By relying on inference, explain the authors, courts dispense with 
the needs to divine the intent of a corporation and to identify evidence of a natural 
person’s subjective state of mind.  The former task is premised on the dubious notion that 
an inanimate entity can form any intent, and the latter is virtually impossible for the 
simple reason that “[l]awyers will routinely advise their clients not to leave in their files 
any memoranda or statements suggesting a desire to eliminate competitors.”27  By 
contrast, the objective approach asks what intent can be attributed to the defendant in light 
of his observed conduct,28 a much more realistic endeavor. 
Where the attainment of monopoly power is, within the executive’s mind, a 
necessary step towards extracting rents for his own behalf, the search for distinctive 
purposes at each stage is nonsensical.  Our concern, rather, is with scenarios in which the 
methods the executive uses to advance his own personal interests coincide with—but are 
not essential to—those that lead to monopoly power.  To be sure, this is an expedition 
through murky analytic waters.  As early as 1962, a Maryland District Court in American 
Football League v. National Football League,29 acknowledged the difficulty in discerning 
specific-intent where two motives are suggested by the evidence, one legal and the other 
illegal.30 
 What is significant about the inferential leap between observed conduct and a 
finding of specific-intent is that courts more often than not employ a rigid “if-then” 
analysis; that is, specific-intent is conclusively presumed absent a finding of a valid 
business purpose.  Correspondingly, as was demonstrated in Times-Picayune Publishing 
Co. v. United States,31 a valid business purpose will negate specific-intent to monopolize.  
In Times-Picayune, the United States filed a civil suit under Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
against a newspaper publisher, alleging that the publisher’s advertising contracts resulted 
in the restraint of trade, and were an attempt to monopolize trade.32  Rejecting the 
government’s allegation, the Supreme Court held that the publisher’s contracts were 
“predominantly motivated by legitimate business aims, [and therefore] this record cannot 
bear out the specific intent essential to sustain an attempt to monopolize under Section 
2.”33 
Aside from Times-Picayune, perhaps the best evidence of the relevance of business 
justifications to absolve defendants of anti-competitive wrongdoing is found in the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Aspen Skiing Co. v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp34 There, the 
Aspen Skiing Co. operated three mountains in the Aspen, Colorado region.  Aspen 
Highlands, which operated only one mountain, sold skiers multiple skiing passes for all 
four mountains.  Eventually, Aspen Skiing took steps to promote its own mountains, to the 
exclusion of those at Aspen Highlands.  The central issue in that case was whether Aspen 
Skiing presented credible evidence that its actions were motivated by legitimate (i.e., pro-
consumer or efficiency) concerns so as to avoid liability for unlawful monopolization 
under section 2.35  Cass and Hylton point out that the relevance of pro-consumer or 
efficiency concerns in negating a Section 2 accusation are most evident in the opinion 
when the pertinent section is read in conjunction with the lower court’s jury instruction:36 
In considering whether the means or purposes were anti-
competitive or exclusionary, you must draw a distinction here between 
practices which tend to exclude or restrict competition on the one hand and 
the success of a business which reflects only a superior product, a well-run 
business, or luck, on the other…   
* * * 
[A] company which possesses monopoly power and which refuses 
to enter into a joint operating agreement with a competitor or otherwise 
refuses to deal with a competitor in some manner does not violate Section 2 
if valid business reasons exist for that refusal… 
* * * 
We are concerned with conduct which unnecessarily excludes or 
handicaps competitors.  This is conduct which does not benefit consumers 
by making a better product or service available—or in other ways—and 
instead has the effect of impairing competition.37 
 
 The second paragraph, “if valid business reasons exist,” is proof positive for Cass 
and Hylton that “good motives will exculpate.”38   
 
IV. Distinguishing Microeconomics from Business Theory 
 The Aspen decision is unique because the Supreme Court unapologetically opened 
the window to forms of antitrust discourse beyond classical microeconomic theory 
(notwithstanding the general resistance of lower courts to follow this invitation).39  
However, the argument structure employed in that case still reflects a reluctance to 
incorporate all of what we know about how managerial decisions are actually made.  
Specifically, business theory as a vernacular reveals a sound, alternative purpose or 
“intent” underlying managerial decisions in the Section 2 arena.  This purpose, scarcely 
consonant to a “valid business purpose,” is the extraction of “rents” over what an 
executive would receive under an employment arrangement that truly maximized 
shareholder value.  For our purposes, we will define shareholder value as the monetary 
benefits that accrue to corporate shareholders through share price appreciation and 
dividend payouts.40 
 “Rents,” in general terms, are returns in excess of the opportunity cost of the 
resources of the activity.”41  In the context of an employment relationship, we will 
understand “rents” as constituting the excess pay, power, and privilege that an executive 
can extract from his corporation over what a genuine arms-length transaction between him 
and the board directors—his theoretical bosses—would demand.  By definition, the 
extraction of rents in this context is never in the best interests of corporate shareholders for 
the simple reason that the executive is enjoying more than his fair share of the bargain 
with his employer.  The costs born by the shareholders from such largess are known as 
“agency costs”—the costs resulting from maintaining an “agency” relationship with those 
who control corporate decisions.  In addition to the residual loss, that is, the welfare from 
the divergence between agents’ decisions and decisions to maximize principals’ welfare, 
agency costs include:  1) costs of structuring a set of contracts; 2) costs of monitoring and 
controlling the behavior of agents by principals; and 3) costs of bonding to guarantee that 
agents will make optimal decisions or principals will be compensated for the consequence 
of suboptimal decisions. 42 
 Though it may seem intuitively that agency costs are deep and widespread—
certainly, this is what recent anecdotal evidence would suggest—classical 
microeconomics downplays the existence of agency costs.  Under a microeconomic 
approach, firms are rational and behave in a manner consistent with the profit maximizing 
interests of their shareholders.43  Significantly, there is no gap between what managers 
perceive to be the best methods for maximizing profits and the decisions which in fact will 
accomplish that objective.44 
 This perspective is what one group of scholars at Harvard’s Olin Center aptly call 
“the optical contracting approach,”45 and is dominant among microeconomists on the issue 
of executive decision-making.   Proponents of this approach acknowledge that executives 
may be concerned mostly with advancing their careers, even to the detriment of their 
companies.  However, the theory goes, agency costs are minimal or non-existent because 
board members, as the ever-vigilant voices of shareholders, are motivated exclusively by a 
desire to maximize shareholder value, and the executives’ compensation packages are in 
fact designed to serve this purpose.46   
 The above reasoning is also a key assumption of the so-called “Chicago School” of 
antitrust thought, and was adopted by the Supreme Court in its landmark decision in 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.47  There, the Supreme Court 
analyzed whether some Japanese manufacturers of television sets had illegally conspired 
to drive their American competitors from the American market by colluding to 
simultaneously keep prices for the sets artificially high in Japan and low in the United 
States.48  Significantly, the Court ignored “expert opinion evidence of below-cost pricing,” 
opting instead to apply classical microeconomic factors to conclude that “such conduct is 
irrational.”49 
The microeconomic approach, with its rosy optical contracting scenario, is 
alluringly amenable to tidy graphical formulations.  It is also about as reliable as an Enron 
401(k) plan.  Its major flaw is that the key economic actor within the context of an 
antitrust inquiry is the firm, insofar as a distinction between shareholders’ and executives’ 
incentives does not exist.  On the contrary, any undergraduate business student with the 
slightest training in organizational behavior and competitive strategy will know that 
agency costs are a very real, inexorable, and weighty element of the management 
environment of professionally managed corporations—especially publicly held 
corporations.50  This reality was known over a half-century ago to famous Columbia 
University professors Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, who made clear the 
divergence between the owners of the corporation (shareholders) and the professionals 
(managers) who managed it.  They warned that fragmented ownership “released 
management from the overriding requirement that it serve stockholders.”51  A big irony of 
the late 1990’s, states John A. Byrne, et al, in a recent Business Week “Special Report,” is 
that “after years of lavish stock-option rewards meant to remedy the problem, this 
divergence is more extreme than ever.”52  Who could dispute this? 
A more realistic perspective on how managers make decisions is well encapsulated 
in Bebchuck, Fried, and Waller’s “Managerial Power Approach”53:   
The Managerial Power Approach picks up with our analysis of the 
limitations of the optimal contracting approach.  That analysis indicates 
that corporate managers have considerable power.  Even nominally 
independent directors are often connected to executives by bonds of 
interest, collegiality, or affinity…  Given the considerable influence of the 
CEO and CEO’s management team over the board, bargaining over 
executive compensation does not usually approach the arm’s length deal.  
Rather, executives frequently use their power to increase their 
compensation, and directors cooperate with management at least to some 
extent…  Under the managerial power approach, the greater the CEO’s 
power, the higher the rents with tend to be.”54 
 
 While the object of Bebchuk’s, et al, study was narrowly focused on the forces that 
shape executive compensation agreements, the important thing to remember as we move 
forward is that executives enjoy considerable power to affect outcomes in ways that 
extract rents from their companies.  In the next section, we will see how such rent 
extraction may be confused with attempts at illegal monopolization. 
  
V. Hidden Agendas 
 Some outcomes are conducive to rent extraction by executives for their personal 
welfare.  An attempt at achieving a certain subset of these outcomes, when viewed only 
through the lens of microeconomics, appears to be driven by anticompetitive motivations.  
In fact, predation of any sort is neither necessary nor specifically intended for rent 
extraction within this subset of outcomes.   
 
V(1). Size 
 One such outcome is sheer size, in terms of revenue and numbers of employees.55  
There is a wealth of evidence to support the contention that the pecuniary rewards 
received by executives, such as salaries, bonuses, and stock options, are positively tied to 
the revenue growth rates of their firms.56  The key word here is “revenue.”  Economist 
Dennis C. Mueller writes the following:  “the prestige and power which managers derive 
from their occupations are directly related to the size and growth of the companies and not 
to its profitability.”57  Employee headcount is driven less by pecuniary motives, and more 
by plain egoism.  Like feudal lords of the Middles Ages who measured their own self-
worth by how many bodies (servants) they dominated, today’s corporate executives derive 
enormous psychic satisfaction from the mere volume of employees they supervise.  Lou 
Gerstner, former CEO of IBM and author of Who Says Elephants Can’t Dance, discusses 
his company's feudal system of redundant assistants:  “I’ll never forget my first 
impression of one IBM meeting.  Arranged around a long conference room were all the 
nobles of IBM’s offshore, geographical fiefdoms….  During a coffee break, I asked Ned 
Lautenbach, ‘Who are all these people who are clearly watching but not participating?’  
He said, ‘those are executive AA.’  Hundreds, if not thousands, of IBM middle- and 
senior-level executives had assistants assigned to them.’58  George Washington University 
law professor Lawrence Mitchell, author of Corporate Irresponsibility: America's Newest 
Export, takes the feudal analogy even further:  "The Ken Lays and Bernie Ebbers were 
made heroes during the 1990s…  like feudal lords, [they] took what they thought they 
were entitled to and left the peasants what they thought they should get."59 
 The easiest way to increase in both dimensions, size and employee headcount, is 
by merging with other, preferably large, firms.  Whether an actual monopoly of goods or 
services results from this arrangement is of tangential concern for the rent-maximizing 
executive.  Where there is substantial concern, it is not a question of how to, but of how 
not to; the managerial power approach suggests that an executive would seldom risk 
incurring the wrath of antitrust authorities to achieve a monopoly (the enhanced 
profitability of which would benefit shareholders) when he could extract rents in other, 
legally acceptable ways. 
 
V(2). Diversification 
 Another outcome that is conducive to rent extraction, but may arouse suspicion 
among antitrust authorities, is “diversification.”  What is meant here is not diversification 
across different industries, such as if McDonalds purchases Sony.  This type of acquisition 
is unlikely to attract attention for the simple fact that market share in either industry will 
not be increased.  Rather, what is meant is diversification of revenue streams.  Thus, an 
intra-industry acquisition would meet this definition, such as if McDonald’s acquired 
Burger King; although still operating within the fast food industry, McDonald’s has 
diversified itself in the sense that the aggregate revenue from all of its pre-existing 
operations is now less than one hundred percent of the post-merger consolidated revenue.   
 Shrewd executives know that diversification of revenue streams reduces risk.  But 
what risk in particular?  Individual shareholders can easily achieve the same 
diversification by buying in different firms directly through stock or indirectly through 
mutual funds.  Moreover, a stockholder does not need a company to incur the tremendous 
transaction costs incident to a merger or acquisition when he can easily achieve the same 
result for the price of a broker’s commission. 
 The unspoken risk here is the risk to the executive’s own career, an asset which is 
hard to diversify.60  As one financial scholar poignantly observes, “if a company goes 
bankrupt or enters a period of financial difficulties, the middle-aged manager pays a heavy 
economic price.  It is reasonable for such a manager to seek a higher level of security by 
trying to stabilize the income of the corporation.”61 
 In addition to their own career interests, points out Bryan Ford, executives often 
have emotional attachments to their corporations:     
Many executives devote most of their professional lives to one 
organization.  They derive a sense of identity and purpose through their 
connection with the corporation. Through their loyalty, talent, and hard 
work, they have risen to the upper reaches of the organization. Naturally, 
executives often feel a deep attachment to the corporation that is almost of 
a proprietary nature.  In addition, top executives often feel possessory 
toward the corporation because of the roles they played in the 
development of the corporation. Executives shape the corporation, in part, 
through their decisions. They, in essence, helped build the corporation into 
what it is and feel that this gives them certain ownership rights.  
 
 
V(3).  The Bootstrap Game 
 The third outcome also serves managerial interests, but involves financial 
engineering of Enronesque proportions.  Many executive compensation packages include 
an earnings-per-share (EPS) component, that is, an executive’s compensation is partly a 
function of his ability to raise the company’s earnings-per-share.  Though this component 
fell into disfavor during the go-go days of the 1990’s, it is still being used, and is likely to 
increase in popularity once again as investors seek more concrete methods of measuring 
executive performance than stock price appreciation. 
 Where EPS is used as a compensation criterion, it is important for antitrust 
observers to understand the ways by which EPS can be manipulated, insofar as a 
potentially anticompetitive intent may turn out to be nothing more than another episode of 
managerialism.  Known to financial analysts as “the Bootstrap Game,” a company 
increases its EPS by acquiring another firm, yet makes no monopoly profits, indeed, no 
economic gains whatsoever.  Brealy and Myers describe how this works through the 
fictional acquisition of Muck and Slurry by World Enterprises: 
“Because Muck and Slurry has relatively poor growth prospects, its stock 
sells at a lower price-earnings ratio [10] than does World Enterprises’ 
stock [20]…  The market value of World Enterprises after the merger 
should be equal to the sum of the separate values of the two firms…  
Since World Enterprises’ stock [$40] is selling for double the price of 
Muck and Slurry stock [$20]…  World Enterprises can acquire the 
100,000 Muck and Slurry shares for 50,000 of its own shares.  Thus 
World will have 150,000 shares outstanding after the merger.  Total 
earnings double as a result of the merger…  but the number of shares 
increases by only 50 percent.  Earnings per share rises…  We call this the 
bootstrap effect because there is no real gain created by the merger and no 
increase in the two firms’ combined value. * * *  Financial manipulators 
sometimes try to ensure that the market does not understand the deal.  
Suppose that investors are fooled by the exuberance of the president of 
World Enterprises and by plans to introduce modern management 
techniques…  They could easily mistake the 33 percent post-merger 
increase in earnings per share for real growth.”62 
 
 
V(4).  Spinning 
 The forth and final outcome which we will examine is called “spinning” by Wall 
Street insiders.63  In what would be called “bribing” among more plebian circles, the 
technique is as simple as it is shameless:  Executives of large corporations send 
investment banks business on behalf of the firms they lead in exchange for personal 
access to hot IPO offerings.64  Shareholders, unsurprisingly, end up subsidizing the 
payoffs vis-à-vis retained earnings.  The theory here is that executives may be responding 
not to anticompetitive motivations, but to the hefty incentives created by the analysts 
whose compensation is largely a function of the mergers and acquisitions (fee-based) 
business they generate.   
 The chart below illustrates what some companies paid one investment bank, 
Solomon Smith Barney, and what their respective CEO’s got in return:65 
Executive Personal Profits from 
IPO Stock Sales 
Fees Paid to Solomon 
Bernard Ebbers 
(former WorldCom CEO) 
$11.5 million $107 million 
Philip Anschultz 
(former Quest chairman) 
$4.8 million $37 million 
Joseph Nacchio 
(former Question CEO) 
$1.0 million $37 million 
Stephen Garofalo 
(Former Metromedia Fiber CEO) 
$1.5 million $47 million 
Clark McLeod 
(former McLeodUSA CEO) 
$9.4 million $49 million 
 
 What type of banking services were provided for these eye-popping fees?  In the 
case of WorldCom, as in most others, the lion’s share of the fees were related to mergers 
and acquisitions deals.  Appropriately, WorldCom’s CEO, Ebbers, named his gargantuan 
yacht “The Acquisition.” One Fortune Magazine reporter describes the aftermath: 
Corporate America is still aching from Wall Street’s horrendous M&A 
advice in the late 1990’s.  The investment banks championed hordes of 
misguided deals, from Conseco/Green Tree to WorldCom/MCI to AOL 
Time Warner…  In each case the buyer paid such huge premiums that the 
deal was dead on arrival, causing enormous losses in shareholder value.  
Wall Street firms not only collected big fees for selling overpriced deals 
but also justified the overpayments by writing “fairness opinions” for 
their clients—for an additional $1 million or so per opinion.  In those 
remarkable documents they dredged up every conceivable bogus rationale 
to show that their clients were paying a reasonable price.  It was the 
fairness opinions that shielded management from shareholder suits.66 
 
 The aftermath may have surprised some lawyers, but not corporate governance 
scholars, most of whom understand that the state of today’s corporate governance is the 
(dysfunctional) equivalent of MTV’s Osborne Family:  lots of love and no accountability.   
 
VI. Bringing It All Together 
 For our purposes, what is important to understand from these events is that the 
mergers and acquisitions were propounded in the names of “efficiency,” “synergy,” and 
other fashionable objectives commonly used to defend against accusations of attempted 
monopolization.  We now know that these deals were some the grandest corporate 
fleecings of all time.  They were fleecings not because the promised economic benefits to 
corporate shareholders failed to materialize—indeed, an honest mistake does not 
constitute a fleecing.  Rather, they were fleecings because the non-relenting barrage of 
investigations, indictments, guilty pleas, government settlements, and fines seem to 
indicate that the executives were less than loyal to their fiduciary obligations.   
 As a result, corporate combinations and divestitures are—at least for the 
moment—scrutinized diligently and presumptively suspect (as they should be).  With an 
eye towards the heady 1990’s, a judge hearing a Section 2 case wherein the defendant 
proffers “synergy” as the company’s “legitimate business purpose” may feel compelled to 
discount its legitimacy.  However, it should be clear by this point that to automatically 
infer attempted monopolization from the absence of a legitimate business purpose would 
be inappropriate. 
 Bearing in mind some non-business purpose ways in which executives personally 
benefit from corporate combinations, the $64,000 question becomes:  Why would 
executives choose to combine with a company within a related industry when managerial 
rent extraction can be obtained through a corporate combination in a non-related industry?  
The only explanation, one might infer, is a specific intent on the part of the executives to 
monopolize.  Indeed, this is the expeditious logic used by countless courts in inferring 
specific-intent from some observable conduct.67  As will be demonstrated, however, 
business theory offers an alternative and more credible explanation for why executives 
would prefer to combine with a related company. 
 As stated earlier, key corporate decision-makers have a substantial part of their 
livelihoods and esteem tied up in their firms.  They got to the executive-level positions 
they occupy by investing in a long-term learning effort of their specific company’s 
business.  This is consistent with a studies that found that CEO’s, on average, are 
employed at the same corporation for 25 years before becoming CEO, 68 and that more 
than 42% have never worked for another firm.69  Given the idiosyncrasies of each 
company’s business model and operations, these executives realize that their value within 
their respective firms is greater than their market value.70  Hence, there is a powerful 
incentive to combine with a company in related field, to the extent that the post-merger 
entity will continue to value the executives’ credentials at a premium. 
 One might also ask why this argument is never articulated during antitrust suits as 
a defense to a charge of attempted monopolization.  Of course, the main reason is that 
microeconomics, the vernacular through which antitrust inquiries are made, understates 
the conflict between the executives’ personal interest and the profit-maximizing interests 
of a company’s shareholders.  After all, microeconomics views the firm as the competitive 
agent, not the humans who control the firm.  The other reason is that setting forth this 
defense would be suicidal to an executive’s career; he would essentially be admitting 
publicly that although he did not mean to illegitimately harm his company’s competition, 
he did mean to extract rents from his company’s shareholders. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 The antitrust literature has yet to fully integrate business theory into the current 
vernacular of microeconomics.  This paper is a small step toward understanding whether, 
and how, managerial self-dealing can explain seemingly anticompetitive conduct on the 
part of the firm.  I use the economically ambiguous realm of mergers and acquisition as a 
vehicle to demonstrate that corporations may not be acting for their own legitimate 
competitive advantage or the illegitimate harm of their competitors, but for the personal 
benefit of their executives.  Such an explanation adds another dimension in the search for 
the true intentions of key decision-makers when analyzing the specific-intent element 
under Section 2.  It is not, however, a justification for laxer enforcement or Section 2.  
Rather, it is meant to provoke additional research into which set of assumptions we should 
apply in analyzing specific-intent. 
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